

## Greenfell notes

Laurence Ioannou

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To: Laurence Ioannou <[REDACTED]@lond-amb.nhs.uk>;

### Decision;

- Initially SI. Remain "its not as bad as it looks. We believe it is primarily an external fire and has not penetrated internally". At this stage still only 2-3 self extricated patients, no one had being brought out by LFB. So although you could see people trapped, the numbers were still unknown.

- Declaration of MI. Due to CP7 - LFB advised significant fire resucure guidance. Approx 25 calls, across 15 levels involving up to 80 people trapped. At that point I decided that if/when these people were potentially going to be evacuated that the

- Decision to move to 2 sectors. Initially LFB were bringing all patients to a specific point at the Grenfell Rd side. Without notice or fore warning (that I heard), we received notification of patients being taken to the other side of the building. 2-3 HART were sent to recon the area. Intel provided suggested multiple patients, and no quick access to current CSS. So decision made to send 2 IROs to other side and setup "sector 2". Sector 1 being the "first" sector. This continued to determine there was no easy access from Sector 2 to Sector 1, so work begun on "mirroring" two sides of response. Unable to shutdown sector 1, as always real and significant chance of multiple patients appearing on that side without notice. HEMS teams fluidly deployed between sites as needed.

- Scene safety. Reassessed multiple time. I would not allow any HART crews into building. The risk of structural collapse was present. Large amount of smoke. It made sense for HART to work "on the edge"  
- to retrieve from LFB, triage, and take to CSS. No formal attempt in any silver meeting for HART to enter building. LFB in multiple silver meetings; we do not believe super structure will collapse, but real risk of partial/sub structure collapses.

### Debrief;

- Shift changeover issues  
- Need maps/boards  
- EOC doing fire calls, staying on the line, causes issues around LFB not being aware of locations of people on fire, and thus unable to direct rescue crews as needed. Plus what advice did LAS did as fire

<https://mail.londonambulance.nhs.uk/owa/>

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survival? Because LFB changed their advice mid-way through the job from stay, to run, what did LAS do?

- Carry sheets. 20 per IRO car. 30 per HART vehicle?

Kind regards,

**Laurence Ioannou**

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## Metropolitan Police Station

Exhibit No. LJ1/1	Cust No.	Serial No. MPSZ13134489
Ex. Book No. 209/2	OCU:	Other Stn. Ref. Lab Ref. No.

Description of exhibit: Notes made by  
Laurence J. Ioannou

From place/person: Laurence J. Ioannou

Taken by: DCA. Webster Date: 26.1.87 Time: 13.34  
pm

Sealed by: Date: Time:

I IDENTIFY THIS EXHIBIT AS THAT REFERRED TO IN  
MY STATEMENT

Signature: 

Signature(s) of additional witness(es)

A. Webster

MP 1404/04

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